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The Role of Entertainment Media in Perceptions of Police Use of Force
Abstract
Scholars have long noted the importance of the media in shaping citizens’ attitudes about crime and
justice. Most studies have focused on the impact of news and particularly local TV news, yet Americans
spend far more time watching entertainment media. We examine the portrayal of police misconduct in
crime dramas, and how exposure to these portrayals affects perceptions of the police. We find that
viewers of crime dramas are more likely to believe the police are successful at lowering crime, use force
only when necessary, and that misconduct does not typically lead to false confessions. In contrast,
perceptions regarding the frequency of force are unaffected. Our results add to a growing literature
demonstrating the importance of entertainment media for attitudes toward crime and the criminal justice
system.
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Entertainment Media and the Police
How do people form their attitudes about police use of force and misconduct? Although
both police departments and academics recognize the importance of trust in and cooperation with
the police (Tyler & Huo, 2002), little is known about where and how citizens form these
impressions. Previous research suggests that much of society learns about crime and criminal
justice processes not by personal experience, but rather via media exposure that shape
perceptions of crime and justice issues (Surette, 2007). For instance, media exposure has been
cited as a more influential factor in shaping Americans’ fear of crime than direct experience
(Chiricos, Padgett, & Gertz, 2000). This should not be surprising given that Americans age 15
and up watch an average of 2.8 hours of television (TV) per day (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2014). Thus, it is likely that the media also play an important role in forming attitudes about the
police specifically.
Studies examining the role of media in perceptions of the police in the United States have
typically focused on exposure to the news. For example, citizens who report having heard or read
about incidents of police misconduct on TV or in newspapers also believe that police misconduct
is more prevalent than those who report less news media exposure (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004).
Other studies focusing specifically on local TV news have found that citizens, especially
minorities, hold more negative attitudes toward the police in the wake of highly publicized
incidents of police misconduct (e.g., Weitzer, 2002; although see Chermak, McGarrell, &
Gruenewald, 2006).
However, local TV news audiences have been steadily shrinking, particularly among
younger viewers (Potter, Matsa, & Mitchell, 2013). There is also some evidence that local TV
news programs spend less time on crime stories than they did in the past (Jurkowitz et al., 2013).
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In any case, it is clear that the average citizen spends much more time watching entertainment
programs: in 2012, Pew People & the Press reported that Americans spend an estimated 52
minutes, on average, watching TV news. In other words, Americans spend more than twice as
much time – over two hours a day – watching entertainment media than news (see also Prior,
2003; Prior, 2005). So what programs are Americans spending so much time watching?
It turns out that the answer to that question is crime dramas. Indeed, crime dramas and
police procedurals are consistently ranked among the most watched entertainment programs on
TV. Just as in 2012-2013, Nielsen Media listed five crime dramas (NCIS, NCIS: Los Angeles,
Blacklist, Person of Interest, and Blue Bloods) among their top ten most watched shows for the
2013-2014 TV season. Given their overwhelming popularity, the myopic focus on TV news is a
bit puzzling. One possible reason that scholars have largely ignored entertainment media is the
ostensibly safe assumption that viewers make a distinction between fact and fiction. Yet Reiner
(2008) cites a British survey that found 29% spontaneously mentioned media fiction as their
main source of information about the police. In the U.S., over 40% of citizens said they believe
crime shows to be somewhat or very accurate (Dowler & Zawilski, 2007). These perceptions are
purposely perpetuated by the writers and producers of crime dramas themselves, who in
interviews reveal that they see educating the public on policing issues as part of their job
(Colbran, 2014).
Some recent work has begun to explore whether and how crime dramas impact
perceptions and attitudes about crime. This research suggests that entertainment media exhibit
the same kinds of effects traditionally found in the context of news programming. For instance,
exposure to crime dramas can increase the salience of crime as a political problem (Holbrook &
Hill, 2005), replicating the agenda setting effect often found in media studies. Similarly, both
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surveys (Holbert, Shah, & Kwak, 2005; Kort-Butler & Hartshorn, 2011) and experiments (Mutz
& Nir, 2010) have demonstrated that exposure to crime dramas can affect policy attitudes,
specifically by making them more punitive (although see Dowler, 2003).
While revealing, these studies have neglected the police in general and police use of force
and misconduct in particular. In fact, the only study of which we are aware comes from Dowler
and Zawilski (2007), who found that while viewers of crime dramas did not hold significantly
different beliefs from non-viewers regarding the frequency of police misconduct, they were more
likely to believe that the wealthy are treated better by the police. They suggest that viewers of
crime dramas had greater exposure to wealthy or high status offenders – a hypothesis supported
by prior content analyses – and that these offenders received better treatment by the police – a
hypothesis that remains an empirical question.
In order to better understand how exposure to crime dramas might affect viewers’
attitudes, it is first necessary to explore how the police are portrayed and whether this portrayal is
consistent across crime dramas. In the next section, we briefly review the results of previous
content analyses of crime dramas, highlighting the fact that prior studies give only hints about
the portrayal of police use of force and misconduct. As a result, we conducted a content analysis
of three popular crime dramas in 2011-2012, which aided us in generating specific hypotheses
about the ways in which crime dramas might impact perceptions of the police.
Good Guys Wear Blue
Previous content analyses of crime dramas have typically focused largely on the sociodemographics of offenders and victims, as well as the types of crimes committed and the
offenders’ motivations.i A review of these analyses provides three important insights. The first is
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that the portrayal of crime and offending is similar across programs. In particular, content
analyses of TV crime dramas consistently find that:





The crimes shown are violent, and typically murder (Brown, 2001; Cavender and
Deutsch, 2007; Deutsch and Cavender, 2008; Eschholz et al., 2004; Rhineberger-Dunn et
al., 2008; Soulliere, 2003)
Offenders tend to be white (Britto et al., 2007; Eschholz et al., 2004; Rhineberger-Dunn
et al., 2008) and middle- or upper-class (Brown, 2001; Soulliere, 2003; Eschholz et al.,
2004; Reiner, 2006; Rhineberger-Dunn et al., 2008)
The explanations for offending lean toward the personal (e.g., psychopathy, greed,
revenge) rather than the sociological (e.g., poverty, gangs; Soulliere, 2003; RhinebergerDunn et al., 2008)
The criminal justice system is portrayed as highly efficacious with respect to
solving crimes (Britto et al., 2007; Dominick, 1973; Eschholz et al., 2004)
A second and related insight is that these consistencies are skewed, in some cases

dramatically, from the reality of crime. For example, whereas murder is the modal and often the
majority of crimes shown on dramas, homicide typically accounts for less than 1% of all crimes
reported to the police (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014). In contrast, less exciting property
crimes, which comprise the bulk of reported crimes, are relatively rare. The good news is that
fictional police departments disproportionately excel at solving these violent crimes: Britto et al.
(2007) found that 100% of crimes featured in Law & Order: SVU were cleared by arrest. At the
same time, the actual clearance rate (i.e., the percent of crimes for which someone was arrested
and charged) in New York City was 49%. Eschholz et al. (2004) also reported that the success
rate among criminal justice officials in crime dramas remained much higher than reality: the
arrest rate during the 1999-2000 season was 78% in NYPD Blue and the conviction rate was 61%
in Law & Order, while the actual NYPD clearance rate for violent crimes in 1999 was 29%.
The third insight is that existing content analyses have relatively little to say about the
portrayal of police on TV. Beyond demographics and the efficacy of the criminal justice system,
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only two quantitative analyses (Britto et al., 2007; Eschholz et al., 2004) have examined other
factors related to the portrayal of the police. What they found, however, is intriguing: crime
dramas depict the police as committing a number of civil liberties violations, though usually in a
positive light (i.e., as necessary for officers to bring an offender to justice). One of the most
frequent violations shown was a failure to Mirandize suspects at the time of arrestii, although
physical abuse and excessive use of force against suspects was not uncommon, either. This
magnification of officers’ role in society may suggest to viewers that the ends justify the means
and that police use of force and misconduct is often warranted. Indeed, “[t]he casual use of civil
rights violations with no repercussions may prime viewers to believe that this is how policing is
and ‘should’ be done” (Eschholz et al., 2004, p. 173). Importantly, this depiction is not unique to
the U.S., as Leishman and Mason’s (2002) qualitative assessment of the portrayal of police in
British media reveals “rule-breaking is a central theme” (p. 68).
While suggestive, these analyses leave many questions unanswered. How frequently and
what kinds of force are used against suspects? Do the police engage in other kinds of misconduct
and, if so, what? Is the use of force and police misconduct portrayed as necessary as Eschholz et
al. (2004) suggest? Or does it result in innocent civilians getting pulled into the criminal justice
system? Although it is likely that the arrests and convictions in crime dramas are often portrayed
as accurate (that is, that the criminal justice system is apprehending and punishing the factually
guilty), previous analyses have not explicitly examined this. In order to answer these and other
questions, we conducted a content analysis that assessed several aspects of interest relating to the
police in general and use of force specifically.
An Updated Content Analysis: Data and Methods
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Our content analysis was conducted by two undergraduate research assistants, who
together coded an entire season (23-24 episodes) of The Mentalist (season 4), Criminal Minds
(season 7), and NCIS (season 9). These shows were chosen based on Nielsen ratings data for
2011-2012, which identified them as the most popular crime dramas of the television season.iii
We met with both assistants and discussed the coding sheet beforehand; the unit of analysis is the
crime.iv The assistants then coded the first four episodes of The Mentalist and the last four
episodes of NCIS in order to calculate inter-rater reliability (κ = .71). There was some variation
in reliability, with objective codes (e.g., socio-demographics, police use of force; κ = .73)
eliciting slightly higher reliability than subjective (e.g., suspect demeanor, necessity of force; κ
=.68) codes. Disagreements were discussed with both coders to identify problem codes.
Subsequently, one assistant coded The Mentalist and the first half of NCIS while the other coded
the second half of NCIS and Criminal Minds.
In addition to collecting standard socio-demographic information (e.g., gender, race, age,
and socio-economic status of the victim[s] and offender[s]) and aspects of the crime committed
(e.g., type of crime, weapon used), the coding sheet also gathered data on the key variables of
interest for this analysis. This included police use of force, perceptions regarding the justifiability
of that force (including the offender’s demeanor [civil, non-compliant and disrespectful, hostile
and resistant] and the necessity of force [yes or no] given the situation), and the frequency and
type of other kinds of police misconduct. The coding sheet was refined based on the initial data
and post-reliability conversations with the coders, and is available upon request.
It should be noted that while the final coding sheet was relatively straightforward with
respect to most of the variables collected (e.g., did the offender have a stated criminal record [yes
or no]), criminal justice scholars disagree as to what exactly constitutes the use (and misuse) of
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force and misconduct among police officers. For example, handcuffing can be performed
respectfully in the context of arresting a suspect, or it can be done violently as a way of
physically bullying a suspect. Likewise, certain verbal commands might be viewed as force
depending on the context. Because of this lack of consensus, we took a broad view of force and
measured any actions that could be construed as such (verbal command, verbal threat, restraint
force [handcuffing, rough pat-downs], striking/hitting with body part, striking/hitting with
weapon, joint manipulation, used non-lethal weapon [mace, TASER], displayed firearm,
discharged firearm [non-lethal], discharged firearm [lethal], other [describe]). Coders were asked
to rate the highest level of force used by an official. Similarly, we took a broad view of
misconduct beyond the use of excessive force, asking coders to note anything that might be
construed as police misconduct (accepting complementary items, unnecessary
stopping/detention, using insulting language toward civilian, taking bribes, using excessive force,
direct involvement in criminal activity, other [describe]).
Content Analysis Results
Our analysis revealed that one season of all three shows portrayed 252 crimes committed
by 155 unique offenders. As with previous content analyses, the majority of crimes committed
were murder or attempted murder (66%). Other violent and relatively unusual crimes comprised
much of the remaining offenses coded, including kidnapping (8%), assault (6%), rape (2%), and
torture (2%). By contrast, theft and “victimless” crimes (e.g., drug use, prostitution, and
gambling) comprised a small portion of offenses coded (4% and 3%, respectively).
In general, offenders were white (76%), middle- to upper-class (67%) males (77%).
Moreover, as Table 1 shows, nearly all offenders (92%) were correctly identified, and a majority
(64%) were arrested for their crimes. The Criminal Minds team was by far the most successful,
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correctly identifying every single offender in this season; the least accurate team was NCIS, who
correctly identified 88% of offenders (though they also had twice as many offenders to deal with
compared to Criminal Minds). Given these results and previous content analyses, we expect
viewers of crime dramas to believe the police are more successful in getting criminals off the
street than non-viewers (H1). Moreover, the similarities across these shows to previous content
analyses in terms of crime type, offender demographics and motivations, and police efficacy
increase our confidence that our findings regarding police use of force and misconduct would be
broadly applicable to many other crime dramas shown in recent years, such as NYPD Blue, Law
& Order, and CSI.
[Table 1 About Here]
We also found that in the remaining cases where the offender was not correctly identified
the police were unable to solve the crime because the episode ended. That is, instances in which
the offender was unidentified occurred not because the police made a mistake, but because they
were unable to identify anyone at all who might have committed the crime. Thus, these crime
dramas collectively gave no indication that the police ever mistakenly target innocent citizens.
Portraying the police in this manner likely sends a strong message about the accuracy as well as
the efficacy of the criminal justice system. Because criminal justice officials are shown as rarely
or never targeting an innocent person, we also expect viewers to be more likely to believe that
misconduct by the police rarely leads to wrongful convictions relative to non-viewers (H2).
In addition to being highly successful and accurate, the police were also shown as
engaging in the use of force quite frequently. Over half of all offenders had force employed
against them (57%), though this figure was substantially higher on Criminal Minds (see Table 1).
Moreover, when the police engaged in force, they employed a variety of techniques. Nearly 20%
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of the encounters in which force was employed (n = 92) involved only verbal commands or
verbal threats. Much more common was the use of physical force, including restraint force (e.g.,
handcuffing or rough pat-downs), hitting the suspect or engaging in a joint manipulation
technique, or using a non-lethal weapon (e.g., mace or TASERs). Firearms also made several
appearances in police/offender interactions, including displaying a firearm (16%), and
discharging it in a lethal (10%) or non-lethal (13%) manner.
The portrayal of frequent police use of force in crime dramas stands in contrast to studies
of actual police use of force. Of course, studying police use of force is methodologically
challenging, and estimates of its frequency vary. For instance, less than 2% of citizens in a largescale survey ages 16 and up reported having force used against them (Eith & Durose, 2011). Yet
a comprehensive analysis of observational studies, survey data, and official records suggests that
the police employ force anywhere from 0.19% to 27% of the time, depending on how force is
operationalized and the unit of analysis (Adams, 1996). Regardless, even taking the highest
estimate as the most accurate suggests that fictional police engage in force substantially more
often than the actual police. As the portrayal of force in crime dramas is not reflective of the
rates of force used by police in reality, we expect regular viewers of crime dramas to perceive the
police as engaging in force more often than non-viewers (H3a).
A natural follow-up question is whether this frequent use of force was also portrayed as
necessary and sufficient. As Table 1 shows, nearly four-fifths (79%) of encounters involving the
use of force were perceived as justified. Moreover, we asked coders to record the suspects’
demeanor toward police officers. Offenders were more or less equally split with respect to
whether they were civil and compliant or non-compliant. Specifically, 37% of offenders were
perceived as civil when interacting with the police, 12% were non-compliant and disrespectful
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and 30% were seen as actively hostile and resistant.v Of those who were anything other than civil
(n = 67), one-third engaged in behavior that was not inherently violent (e.g., having a verbal
disagreement with the police that did not involve threats or fleeing from the police). The
remaining two-thirds, however, exhibited much more serious behavior. Specifically, 25% of noncivil offenders threatened harm, 22% assaulted, 4% attempted to kill, and 7% successfully killed
one or more criminal justice officials.
In turn, non-compliant and hostile offenders were significantly more likely to have force
used against them (χ2(6) = 80.8, p < .001), with a majority of these instances (54%) involving the
use of either non-lethal (e.g., TASERs) or lethal (e.g., firearms) weapons.vi Several offenders still
had force used against them even if they were described as civil and compliant (n = 29, or 48%
of all civil and compliant offenders). Given that force was typically perceived as necessary and
used against offenders who were non-compliant, however, we expect viewers to also believe that
the use of force by police is applied appropriately and is almost always necessary to make an
arrest (H3b).
However, just because the force used is necessary does not mean it is perceived as
sufficient. If viewers believe the police engage in more force than non-viewers, then we might
also expect them to perceive this force to be normatively the right amount. It is also possible that
viewers believe the police do not use force often enough or, at a minimum, do not believe them
to be using force more than they should. Thus, we expect viewers to perceive this greater use of
force by police to be at least sufficient if not under-utilized, given the highly disrespectful nature
of most fictional suspects (H3c).
Finally, 9% of police-citizen interactions involved some sort of misconduct beyond the
use of excessive force. The frequency of misconduct differed marginally significantly across
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shows (χ2(4) = 9.3, p = .06): the straight-laced officials in Criminal Minds only engaged in a
single instance of police misconduct, compared to 9% and 12% of the time in The Mentalist and
NCIS, respectively. These instances of misconduct ranged from taking bribes and disobeying
orders from a superior officer to direct involvement in criminal activity (e.g., blackmail, identity
fraud). And while these instances of misconduct were significantly more likely to take place in
episodes that also displayed the use of force (χ2(4) = 67.4, p < .05), they were not significantly
related to the use of unnecessary force (χ2(1) = 1.3, p > .10).
In sum, the results of this content analysis generated a number of expectations concerning
our survey data. While fictional officials in crime dramas are both highly successful and
accurate, they are also shown as engaging in force frequently. Moreover, these instances of
police use of force tend to be portrayed as necessary and justified, a finding that is not surprising
given the demeanor of many suspects. In general, then, we expect viewers to have more positive
and trusting views of the police with respect to the use of force and misconduct than nonviewers.
Survey Data and Methods
To test our expectations based on the content analysis, we utilized data from an online,
omnibus survey funded by RTI International, and fielded by GfK (Knowledge Networks at the
time) March 6-18, 2013. GfK recruits a nationally representative sample for their
KnowledgePanel using random digit dialing and address-based sampling methods; respondents
without web access are given a free laptop with Internet service for as long as they remain an
active part of the panel. Our respondents (n = 2,119) were a probability proportional to size
(PPS) weighted sample of all KnowledgePanel members (n = 55,000); the completion rate for
this survey was 58%.vii Because it was an omnibus survey, these data come from questions asked
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after two unrelated modules.viii In order, respondents were asked [with response options in
brackets]:








In general, how successful do you think the police in your city are at reducing crime?
[Very successful, somewhat successful, somewhat unsuccessful, very unsuccessful]
In general, how often do police officers in your city use physical force against a suspect
when making an arrest? By physical force we mean actions such as wrestling with or
striking the suspect, or using a weapon such as a Taser or firearm. [Almost always; often;
sometimes; rarely; never]
In general, does the police department in your city use force too often, not enough, or
about the right amount when dealing with citizens? [Too often; about the right amount;
not enough]
If you had to choose, would you say that the police in your city generally use force
against a suspect because it was necessary to make the arrest, or because the suspect was
disrespectful and deserved to be “roughed up?” [Necessary to make the arrest; the suspect
deserved it]
Overall, how often does misconduct by the police in your city, such as the use of force to
get a false confession, contribute to someone being found guilty of a crime he or she did
not commit? [Most of the time; sometimes; rarely; never]ix
Table 2 displays the weightedx distribution of these attitudinal variables, and reveals that

citizens overall have very positive perceptions of and attitudes toward the police. Nearly fourfifths of respondents (77%) believe that the police are very or somewhat successful at reducing
crime; nearly two-thirds (63%) believe that misconduct rarely or never leads to false confessions.
When it comes to the use of force specifically, 39% of respondents believe that the police rarely
or never use physical force when making an arrest. In contrast, only 1 in 10 respondents believe
that the police engage in force almost always or often. However, when the police use force, most
citizens agree that it is necessary for arrest (79%), rather than a form of “street justice,” and that
the police use force about the right amount (72%).
[Table 2 About Here]
For the analyses reported below, these attitudinal variables were recoded to range from 0
to 1, with higher numbers corresponding to beliefs that we expect to be more prevalent among
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viewers of crime dramas. Thus, 1 indicates a belief that the police are very successful at reducing
crime, misconduct never leads to false confessions, the police almost always or often use
physical force when making an arrest, they use force because it is necessary for the arrest, and
they do not use force enough when dealing with citizens. As a result, increasing viewership of
crime dramas should exhibit positive relationships with these attitudinal variables. Moreover,
recoding from 0 to 1 facilitates interpretation by revealing the maximal effect of variables, and
allows for (rough) relative comparisons of the substantive impact of variables in the model.
Respondents were subsequently asked how much time they spend watching local TV
news (“In a typical week, how much time per weekday do you spend watching local television
news?”) as well as fictional crime dramas (“In a typical week, how much time do you spend
watching fictional crime dramas, such as CSI? This can include shows that are no longer airing
new episodes, such as NYPD Blue or the original Law & Order.”) in minutes, as indicated by the
open-ended box. Unfortunately, the question wording for the local TV news variable appears to
have been misinterpreted by a number of respondents: in the extreme, respondents indicated
impossible watching times of 4000 minutes (67 hours) for local TV news in a typical day,
suggesting that they focused on the introductory phrase, “in a typical week.”
As a result, data from a 2011 survey of Long Island, NY residents that used identical
question wording were used as a benchmark for comparison. Comparisons of the distribution of
these two recoded variables can be found in the Appendix, although it should be noted that Long
Islanders are whiter, older, and more educated than national samples. A conservative cut-off of
180 minutes per day was usedxi for viewers of local TV news; any higher reports were divided by
5 on the assumption that they gave a weekly rather than daily total (7.6% of the sample). For local
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TV news, responses were recoded such that 0 = doesn’t watch, .333 = watches 1-29 minutes,
.667 = watches 30-59 minutes, 1 = watches 60 minutes or more.
Fortuitously, because the key independent variable requested weekly viewing estimates of
crime dramas, it is unlikely that this variable suffers from the same measurement problems as
local TV news viewing. Nonetheless, as reports of crime drama viewing were heavily skewed (s3
= 12.49), responses were recoded such that 0 = doesn’t watch (44%), .5 = watches 1-60 minutes
(25%), 1 = watches 61 minutes or more (31%).
The survey concluded by asking respondents for basic socio-demographic information,
including gender, race/ethnicity, age, education, income, U.S. citizenship, ideology (“Would you
say your views in most political matters are liberal, moderate, or conservative?”), previous
experience with the police (“Have you ever been involved in an encounter with the police other
than a traffic stop? In other words, a situation where the police approached or stopped you as a
suspect?”), and residency information which allowed us to determine whether the respondent
lives in an urban or rural area and in the South according to Census classifications. These
variables were all recoded to range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating males, blacks, Hispanics, the
oldest respondent (91), the highest level of education and income, having been born in the U.S.,
identifying as conservative, having had a previous encounter with the police, living in an urban
area, and in the South.
Survey Results
Before examining the relationship between viewership of crime dramas and attitudes
directly, we first run simple models predicting exposure to crime dramas. Although this cannot
completely dispel criticisms of selection bias (i.e., that viewers of crime dramas tend to watch
such shows because they reinforce pre-existing beliefs), such an analysis can, at a minimum,
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describe audiences of crime dramas demographically. Thus, Table 3 displays the results from an
ordered probit model predicting viewership of crime dramas.xii
[Table 3 About Here]
Whereas females and older respondents are more likely to report watching crime dramas
than males and younger respondents, the remaining variables are statistically insignificant
predictors.xiii On average, females reported watching 65 minutes of crime dramas relative to 57
minutes for males; the oldest individuals reported watching nearly 80 minutes of crime dramas in
a typical week, compared to 42 minutes for the youngest respondents in the sample. Unlike most
analyses, the poor model fit here is good news, as the results suggest that crime drama audiences
are generally representative of Americans as a whole. Although females and older respondents
tend to be more fearful of crime and hold less punitive attitudes when it comes to crime policies,
it is unclear whether these gender and age differences would also translate to attitudes regarding
police force and misconduct. However, concerns about self-selection are relatively assuaged with
the knowledge that, at least in this sample, liberals, Black respondents, and urban dwellers report
watching crime dramas just as much as conservatives, non-Blacks, and rural residents. In other
words, it is unlikely that differences between viewers and non-viewers are a function of
ideological differences, race, or proximity to crime.
Given that the relationship between reported exposure to crime dramas and perceptions of
the police is unlikely due to self-selection, we now turn attention to the results of interest. Table
4 displays the coefficients for two ordered probit models, the first assessing police success (i.e.,
efficiency) and the second the degree to which police misconduct leads to false confessions (i.e.,
accuracy). Looking first at Column 1, and in accordance with H1, greater reported exposure to
crime dramas is associated with an increase in the probability of believing the police are
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successful at reducing crime net controls.xiv Thus, holding all other variables at their means and
modes,xv those who watch more than an hour of crime dramas a week are roughly four
percentage points more likely to believe the police are “very successful” at reducing crime
compared to those who watch no crime dramas.xvi To more readily compare the substantive
effect of watching crime dramas vis-à-vis conservatism, we plot the impact of these two
variables on holding more pro-police attitudes for this model and the ones below in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 About Here]
Similarly, Column 2 reveals that our survey data align with H2, which held that exposure
to crime dramas is associated with a belief that misconduct does not lead to false confessions.xvii
In particular, increased viewership is associated with a seven percentage point increase in the
probability of believing that misconduct rarely or never leads to false confessions. Although the
impact of crime dramas is not overwhelming, it is on par with the impact of self-identifying as a
conservative rather than a liberal, as seen in Figure 1.
[Table 4 About Here]
Next, Table 5 examines several aspects of attitudes toward police use of force, and
specifically perceptions of the frequency with which force is deployed, the necessity of this
force, and the sufficiency of this force. Column 1 displays the ordered probit estimates for the
frequency with which the police use force against suspects; due to the small number of
respondents at the margins, responses of “almost always” and “often” were combined, as were
“rarely” and “never” for analysis. Column 2 displays the probit coefficients for predicting
perceptions of the justifications for force, and the final two columns display the multinomial
estimates for normative attitudes toward the frequency with which force is used: do they use
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force too often (Column 3) or not enough (Column 4) compared to respondents who said they
use force about the right amount.
Column 1 of Table 5 reveals that, contrary to H3a, watching crime dramas has no effect
on perceptions regarding the degree to which the police actually use force when making
arrests.xviii This is surprising, given the overwhelming extent to which viewers of crime dramas
are exposed to police use of force. Nonetheless, these findings are in line with those of Dowler
and Zawilski (2007), who also found no relationships between crime drama viewership and
perceptions regarding the degree to which police engage in various forms of misconduct.
Although viewership of crime dramas does not appear to affect perceptions regarding the
frequency with which police engage in force, it does correlate with perceptions regarding the
necessity of that force. As shown in Column 2 and in line with H3b, self-reports of watching
crime dramas significantly predicts that a respondent believes force used by the police is usually
necessary for arrest, rather than because the suspect deserved it. Consequently, all else constant,
watching crime dramas increases the probability of believing the use of force was necessary by
six percentage points (see Figure 1). Finally, Columns 3 and 4 reveal that H3c receives qualified
support.xix On one hand, regular exposure to crime dramas is negatively linked with the
probability of believing the police engage in force too often. That is, watching crime dramas is
associated with a nearly five percentage point decrease in the probability of believing that the
police engage in force too often, relative to the right amount. However, exposure to crime
dramas does not affect one’s propensity to believe that the police do not engage in force enough.
Thus, a weaker version of our hypothesis holds, in that viewers are less likely to believe police
use of force occurs too often; however, viewers are no more likely to believe the police do not
engage in force often enough relative to non-viewers.
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[Table 5 About Here]
Although not our primary focus, we also find several results among the control variables
worthy of mention. For one, local TV news viewing was associated with perceptions regarding
the relationship between misconduct and false confessions and the belief that police use force too
often relative to the right amount. Thus our results provide support for the claim that local TV
news influences perceptions about crime (Chiricos et al., 2000), although content analyses of the
portrayal of police in local TV news would be helpful to understand when attitudes toward the
police should be affected by local TV news and when they should not. Regardless, it is not
terribly surprising to see this effect given that some police-citizen encounters generate interest
from news media outlets across the country because of their significance. Take, for example, the
unfortunate killings of Michael Brown and Eric Garner, which resulted in vast media coverage
and protests across the country. This suggests that even when examples of police misconduct
(perceived or otherwise) are not germane to one’s locale, citizens may still be exposed to images
from elsewhere around the country.
By comparison, ideology and prior police experience played a much greater and more
consistent role in explaining perceptions of police use of force. The effects of conservatism
mirrored that of viewing crime dramas on a regular basis with one important exception:
conservatives were less, not more, likely to believe that the police are successful at lowering the
crime rate. At first glance this finding might seem counterintuitive; however, conservatism
focuses more on protection of society, while liberals emphasize provision of services (JanoffBulman, 2009). Thus, while conservatives espouse “limited government” (Kinder, 1998) it is
only in the domains of social welfare spending, and not protection-oriented services such as the
military and police. Given this added focus on protection by conservatives, it seems plausible
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that conservatives have higher expectations for the police than liberals. Relatedly Hipp (2010)
reported that wealthier individuals, a consistent predictor of conservatism (Gelman, 2009;
McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006), were more likely to think crime was a more pervasive
problem than their less wealthy counterparts. Piecing all of this together provides a plausible,
though untested, explanation for why conservatives might view the police as less successful at
combatting crime than liberals.
Similarly, previous police experience was only a non-significant predictor for perceptions
of the necessity of force. Not surprisingly, respondents who reported having prior contact with
police were more likely to think force is used during arrest and that the police use force too
often, and less likely to view the police as successful at lowering crime, and that police
misconduct rarely leads to false confessions. Oddly, however, these respondents were also
significantly more likely to indicate police do not use force enough, compared to the right
amount. One potential explanation for this counterintuitive finding is that the results are a
function of the type of previous encounter the respondent had with police. That is, our question
asked respondents whether they had previous encounters with the police, and not whether they
had summoned the police as a complainant or victim, or whether they were the suspect or
offender of a crime. If this question captured both types of encounters (as victims and offenders),
then we would see a pattern of responses similar to what is shown in Table 5, with victims
expressing dissatisfaction over the (perceived) lack of force and offenders expressing
dissatisfaction over the (perceived) excessive use of force.
Last but not least, our models indicate that, as with many aspects of the criminal justice
system, black respondents hold significantly different views relative to whites. In particular,
blacks were more likely to believe police use force when making arrests and use it too often, and
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less likely to think false confessions are not linked to some form of police misconduct. However,
while the effect of watching crime dramas on attitudes toward the police was in every case
stronger for white respondents (n = 1,766), this difference was not significant compared to
Blacks (n = 202) as tested by an interaction between the dummy variable for Blacks and crime
drama viewership.
Discussion
Survey research consistently reveals the esteemed position the police hold relative to
other aspects of the criminal justice system (Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate, 2000). As Warr (1995)
notes, “[i]f there is any element of the criminal justice system that Americans admire, it is the
police” (p. 301). An obvious question is, why? It seems unlikely that the police often receive
positive news coverage and, even if they do, this is counteracted by the frenetic coverage of
incidents of police brutality and misconduct. Moreover, the most common type of police-citizen
encounter is a traffic stop (Langton & Durose, 2013), and it seems equally unlikely that those
who are stopped for speeding or other minor violations are enthusiastic about their interactions.
Where is this positive image of the police coming from, then?
We believe that the overwhelming popularity of crime dramas, which many citizens tune
in to on a weekly basis, provides a partial answer. The typical formula of these shows is to
follow the lives of passionate and well-intentioned police officers in their quest to solve what are
often heinous crimes. And while some break from this tradition (e.g., The Wire), the vast
majority paint relatively simplistic portraits of good guys and bad guys. In the absence of
information about the true nature of crime and offending, it is easy to see why this facile, not to
mention emotionally and visually compelling, storyline is projected onto the real world.
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Specifically, our content analysis indicated that the police in crime dramas are
exceptional at solving crimes and rarely make mistakes. Moreover, while the police were shown
frequently engaging in force, that force was often portrayed as necessary and justified given that
it was commonly employed against hostile and resistant suspects, many of whom attempted to or
successfully endangered one or more officers’ lives. While our content analysis also revealed
instances of coercive tactics being used to elicit false confessions and other kinds of misconduct,
they were few and far between.
In turn, viewers of crime dramas held significantly different attitudes toward the police
than their non-viewing counterparts. In particular, viewers were more likely than non-viewers to
believe that: 1) the police are successful at combatting crime, 2) misconduct generally does not
lead to false confessions, and 3) force, when used, is typically necessary for an arrest rather than
as a form of street justice. In contrast, viewers and non-viewers had similar views with respect to
the frequency with which police use force. With respect to the sufficiency of this perceived
frequency, viewers were less likely than non-viewers to believe that the police use force too
often, but they were not more likely to believe the police do not use force enough.
Perhaps the largest question this study raises is why some attitudes are affected by
watching crime dramas while others are not. In particular, perceptions regarding the frequency of
police use of force as well as the sufficiency of this frequency (i.e., do the police use force
enough) were the same for both regular viewers and non-viewers. One possible explanation for
these discrepant findings is the degree to which respondents receive information about the police
from other media sources. That is, citizens may be exposed to a lot of information about police
use of force from other media platforms, particularly given the tremendous amount of coverage
some of these events receive. Incidents such as the shooting of Jonathan Farrell shooting in
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Charlotte, North Carolina or Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri are covered not only by local
and national news, but also social media such as Twitter and Facebook. With respect to Michael
Brown specifically, it is clear that the amount of coverage dedicated to the shooting and
subsequent riots in Ferguson differed dramatically across the two platforms (Sullivan, 2014). In
turn, one’s relative exposure to Twitter and Facebook likely impacted not only how important
users perceived this event to be, but also the way in which they perceived it.
In contrast, the modal news media story involving the police focuses on the crime and
offender, rather than the successful apprehension of suspects. Indeed, the news media are
notoriously bad at placing crime stories in a larger context (Iyengar, 1991), which might include
information such as trends in crime and clearance rates and thus inform perceptions of police
success (Surrette, 2007). We suspect that the same is true of network and cable TV as well as
social media. As a result, in the absence of such information, respondents draw on what they
know when answering questions about the degree to which the police are successful at reducing
crime or their ability to correctly identify suspects.
A second and related question is the degree to which regular viewers of crime dramas
hold attitudes and perceptions that are distorted from the reality of crime. Certainly these shows
tend to elicit more pro-police attitudes in general; however, this does not mean that these
attitudes are factually inaccurate. In our view, the answer to that question is mixed. On one hand,
viewers are less likely to think police use force too often, a belief that is consistent with the data
showing police rarely use force (Alpert & Dunham, 2004; Pate & Fridell, 1993). On the other
hand, viewers’ perceptions diverge from reality when assessing the efficacy of police and their
role in obtaining false confessions. According to the FBI, the nationwide clearance rate for
crimes hovers around 30%. Moreover, available evidence suggests that police misconduct often
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leads to false confessions (Innocence Project, 2014) and, in some cases, is directly related to
wrongful convictions (Covey, 2013). Thus, when it comes to the efficacy and accuracy of the
police, viewers are overly optimistic about police practices and results.
With respect to the necessity of force, our content analysis revealed that many suspects
are depicted as resisting police authority, either verbally or physically. In contrast, observational
studies reveal a quite different reality. One large-scale observational study of police-citizen
interactions found that 13% of these encounters involved resistance, half of which was the result
of “passive resistance” – that is, not listening or disobeying directives (Terrill, 2003). Thus,
although we did not ask directly about perceptions of suspect resistance, the fact that viewers
were more likely to perceive the use of force as necessary may be a function of their
(mis)perceptions regarding the level of resistance offered by the typical suspect.
It is clear that dramas distort crime and offending in a number of ways. In the present
study we focused specifically on the use of force and misconduct, as well as issues of innocence.
We suspect, however, that there are several other dimensions on which crime dramas could be
analyzed and found to predict attitudes among viewers. For example, crime dramas appear to
typically portray the police as engaging in traditional policing practices. Community and
problem-oriented policing are not shown, and may be perceived as unnecessary given how
effective the fictional police are at traditional, reactive policing and detective work. Moreover,
given that offenders are typically portrayed as personally responsible and committing crimes for
psychological and pathological – rather than sociological or situational – reasons, viewers of
crime dramas may believe that proactive policing is unnecessary and ineffective. After all, how
would better street lighting prevent a sociopath from kidnapping women?

Running Head: ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA AND POLICE USE OF FORCE

24

Moreover, given that force and misconduct are portrayed as necessary and justified, we
suspect that viewers of crime dramas would also tend to have greater trust in the police than nonviewers. In general, the positive attitudes of viewers may translate into other interesting facets,
such as greater compliance with police commands and reports of higher satisfaction and better
experiences after police-citizen interactions. Indeed, there is some evidence that people interpret
their own experiences with the police in light of their general views (Brandl, Frank, Worden, &
Bynum, 1994), suggesting that exposure to crime dramas might impact not just attitudes, but also
behavior.
Limitations
Of course, as with all studies, ours suffers from a few important limitations. Most
obviously, the question of self-selection cannot be completely ruled out in these data. Given the
potential for endogeneity, experiments such as those designed by Mutz and Nir (2010) should be
conducted in order to address this concern directly. Although a valid concern, we have shown
that crime dramas appeal to a wide variety of Americans, which should assuage concerns of selfselection. That is, while it is relatively plausible that viewers who hold punitive attitudes toward
criminals seek out crime dramas because they show a morality play that is conducive to their
beliefs, it is more difficult to believe that citizens’ perceptions of police use of force and
misconduct leads them to seek out such shows. Relatedly, we must acknowledge the crosssectional nature of our data, which further contributes to the difficulty of ruling out self-selection
as a rival explanation for our results.
In addition, while our results align with insights from previous research (Britto et al.,
2007; Eschholz et al., 2004), it should be reiterated that our analysis focused on only three
popular dramas in recent years. Analyses of other dramas from other periods in time may reveal
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different results, as well as provide additional insights as to why perceptions of force frequency
were uncorrelated with crime drama viewership; this is particularly true given that our survey
asks about crime dramas in general, and not these the three dramas content analyzed specifically.
As a result, it is possible that some of our survey viewers of crime dramas did not watch the
programs analyzed, attenuating the connection between the results of our content analysis and
the survey results.
Nonetheless, the present study contributes to a growing literature on how media affects
perceptions of criminal justice issues. Unlike most quantitative analyses that have focused on the
influence of news media, ours explored the role of crime dramas on respondents’ perceptions of
police efficacy, use of force, and misconduct. Our results support the notion that fictional media
play a role in shaping perceptions of crime and criminal justice issues, but also generates
questions about how viewers reconcile real life events with fictional ones. It appears that
exposure to fictional crime dramas complicates the processing of criminal justice related
information by blurring the line between what is real and what is not. The challenge for
researchers going forward is to better understand how viewers process information from fictional
accounts of the criminal justice system and when that information is reconciled with real-life
events (e.g., frequency of force) and when it is not.
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i

These studies analyzed a narrow set of shows airing at the turn of the century: Britto, Hughes, Saltzman,

and Stroh (2007) – 2003-2004 season of Law & Order: SVU; Eschholz, Mallard, and Flynn (2004) –
2001-2002 seasons of Law & Order and NYPD Blue; Deutsch and Cavender (2008) – 2000-2001 season
of CSI; Soulliere (2003) – a season each of NYPD Blue, Law & Order, and The Practice; and Brown
(2001) – 1999-2000 seasons of NYPD Blue, Law & Order, and Homicide: Life on the Street. There is one
exception: Rhineberger-Dunn, Rader, and Williams (2008) coded seasons 1-15 of Law & Order.
ii

Legally, Miranda warnings need not be read at the time of arrest, a fact that does not appear to have

been taken into account in their coding scheme.
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NCIS: Los Angeles was rated higher than Criminal Minds, but we coded the latter in order to obtain a

wider variety of dramas. All four ranked among Nielsen’s top ten most highly rated shows for 2011-2012.
iv

We chose this as the unit of analysis because the crime, rather than the offender, tends to drive the

storyline and was typically identified at the beginning of the episode. As a result, our research assistants
could code as the story unfolded, even if the offender was not identified until much later or at all.
Additionally, because some offenders committed multiple crimes, and some crimes were committed by
multiple offenders simultaneously, the number of crimes coded does not equal the number of offenders.
v

The following descriptive statistics are based on an n of 162; some offenders made repeat appearances

across episodes and thus had more than one opportunity to engage with the police.
In line with Dowler and Zawilski’s (2007) hypothesis, force was used less often against middle- and

vi

upper-class suspects (χ2(8) = 16.8, p < .05), but not perceived as less necessary (χ2(8) = 10.9, p > .10).
vii

The median completion time for the total survey was 35 minutes. The cumulative response rate for

initial panel recruitment was 5.9%. For more detailed information on GfK’s methodology, please see their
documentation online at http://www.gfk.com/Documents/GfK-KnowledgePanel-Design-Summary.pdf
viii

The first module contained questions about food consumption, and the second module questions about

the respondents’ political views and attitudes toward the new health care law.
ix

This question contained a survey experiment in which half of the respondents were randomly assigned

to receive information about the Innocence Project. Because the results from this survey experiment fall
outside the scope of this paper they are ignored at present. However, the model predicting attitudes
regarding misconduct and false confessions contains a dummy variable to control for this manipulation.
x

Post-stratification weights were generated by GfK using the 2012 Current Population Study as a

benchmark. See http://www.gfk.com/Documents/GfK-KnowledgePanel-Design-Summary.pdf
xi

Pew (2012) reported that while Americans watch an average of 52 minutes of news per day, less than a

third watch an hour of TV news or more per day. Given that the Pew question asked generically about TV
news and not just local TV news, we believe this to be a justifiably conservative cut-off point.
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Many of the ordered probit models failed to meet the assumption of parallel lines. However, in only

one instance did running it as a multinomial logit change the key results. For ease of presentation, then,
ordered probit models are displayed for all but one model, and differences between the two footnoted.
xiii

This model fails to meet the assumption of parallel lines (χ2(11) = 38.27, p < .001). A multinomial

logit reveals that gender and age are only significant predictors at the highest level of watching. In
addition, conservatives were less and Blacks more likely to report watching up to an hour of crime dramas
compared to not at all, effects that run counter to concerns about self-selection. Finally, more educated
individuals were less likely to watch up to an hour of crime dramas compared to not at all.
xiv

xv

This model meets the assumption of parallel lines (χ2(26) = 28.61, p = .33).

Thus, assuming a non-black, non-Hispanic, non-southern female who lives in an urban area, was born

in the U.S., and does not report having a previous encounter with the police.
xvi

The results were driven by those at the higher end of watching crime dramas. All models were re-

estimated with two dummy variables in place of the ordinal measure. Results show watching more than
an hour a week produced significantly different attitudes compared to none at all or up to 60 minutes.
xvii

This model fails to meet the assumption of parallel lines (χ2(14) = 37.48, p < .001), but a multinomial

logit is substantively identical with one exception: conservatives are significantly more likely to say
misconduct rarely or never leads to false confessions, but not sometimes compared to most of the time.
xviii

This model fails to meet the assumption of parallel lines (χ2(12) = 22.46, p < .05). Conservatives, non-

Blacks, and wealthier individuals are significantly less likely to believe the police engage in force almost
always or often, but not sometimes, compared to rarely or never.
xix

This model fails to meet the assumption of parallel lines ( χ2(13) = 99.51, p < .001) and the results for a

number of variables including the key independent variable differed markedly across the three levels of
the dependent variable. As a result, we present the multinominal logistic estimates in Table 5.
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Table 1: The Frequency of Police Use of Force and Misconduct in Crime Dramas
All
Criminal
The
NCIS
Shows
Minds
Mentalist
Correct Offender Identified? (n = 155)
Yes
100
88
93
92
No
0
11
7
7
Force Used
Yes
90
48
49
57
No
3
47
45
38
Type of Force (n = 92)
Verbal Command/Threat
7
25
25
20
Restraint Force
18
13
28
20
Striking/Hitting
18
9
19
15
Displayed Firearm
21
25
3
16
Discharged Firearm
29
25
16
23
Force Necessary (n = 92)
Yes
96
69
75
79
No
4
28
16
16
Suspect Demeanor
Civil
16
33
51
37
Non-compliant/disrespectful
13
9
14
12
Hostile/resistant
65
29
14
30
Other Misconduct
Yes
3
12
9
9
No
90
80
69
78
N=
31
66
65
162
Note: Entries are percentages. Columns may not sum to 100% due to omission of
unknowns and N/A codes. Shows are from the 2011-2012 TV season; each season
consisted of 23 to 24 hour-long episodes.

31

Running Head: ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA AND POLICE USE OF FORCE

Table 2: Distribution of Attitudes toward Police
Percentage
Police Successful at Reducing Crime?
Very successful
17
Somewhat successful
59
Somewhat unsuccessful
15
Very unsuccessful
6
Misconduct Linked to False Confessions?
Never
16
Rarely
47
Sometimes
28
Most of the time
3
Frequency of Force?
Almost always
3
Often
11
Sometimes
44
Rarely
34
Never
4
Necessity of Force?
Necessary for arrest
17
Suspect deserved it
79
Sufficiency of Force?
Too often
12
About the right amount
72
Not enough
12
Note: Entries are weighted percentages. Columns may not
sum to 100% due to omission of “don’t know” and refusals,
and rounding error.
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Table 3: Viewership of Crime Dramas
Conservative
-.024
(.096)
Male
-.155*
(.066)
Black
.025
(.098)
Hispanic
-.179
(.127)
Age
.701*
(.148)
Education
-.138
(.214)
Income
-.212
(.145)
Previous Police Exp.
.029
(.082)
Urban
.029
(.085)
South
.068
(.067)
Born U.S.
.201
(.125)
Cutpoint 1
.021
(.214)
Cutpoint 2
.695*
(.213)
2005
N=
F(11, 1994) =
3.47*
Note: Entries are ordered probit coefficients,
with standard errors in parentheses. Sampling
weights applied. * two-tailed p < .05.
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Table 4: Predicting Perceptions toward Police Efficacy and Accuracy
Police Very Successful Misconduct Not Linked to
At Lowering Crime
False Confessions
Crime Drama Viewing
.141*
.239*
(.072)
(.078)
Local TV News Viewing
-.019
-.246*
(.093)
(.096)
Conservative
-.175*
.241*
(.085)
(.094)
Male
.087
.200*
(.063)
(.067)
Black
.002
-.645*
(.106)
(.134)
Hispanic
-.138
-.122
(.104)
(.141)
Age
.386*
.547*
(.146)
(.165)
Education
.147
-.168
(.224)
(.244)
Income
.298
.356*
(.153)
(.152)
Previous Police Exp.
-.287*
-.487*
(.087)
(.097)
Urban
.232*
-.060
(.090)
(.086)
South
-.045
-.060
(.066)
(.086)
Born U.S.
-.181
.147
(.115)
(.141)
Cutpoint 1
-1.175*
.300
(.251)
(.300)
Cutpoint 2
-.416
1.809*
(.245)
(.305)
Cutpoint 3
1.344*
–
(.249)
N=
1987
1938
F(df) =
3.77* (13, 1974)
7.08* (14, 1925)
Note: Entries are ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
A dummy variable capturing a survey experiment embedded in the misconduct
question was included in the model but is omitted from the table. Sampling
weights applied. * two-tailed p < .05
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Table 5: Predicting Perceptions Regarding Police Use of Force
Police Often Use Force Force Necessary
Police Use Force
When Making Arrests To Make Arrest Too Often Not Enough
Crime Drama Viewing
-.171
.271*
-.632*
-.342
(.091)
(.104)
(.237)
(.230)
Local TV News Viewing
.158
-.054
.645*
.023
(.096)
(.128)
(.314)
(.286)
Conservative
-.269*
.245*
-1.072*
.429
(.091)
(.113)
(.257)
(.262)
Male
.072
-.119
.052
.210
(.066)
(.089)
(.197)
(.200)
Black
.290*
-.147
.549*
.329
(.116)
(.136)
(.266)
(.312)
Hispanic
-.007
.020
-.044
.457
(.150)
(.155)
(.353)
(.311)
Age
-.229
.441*
-.688
-1.117*
(.150)
(.201)
(.470)
(.416)
Education
.123
.587
.159
-2.207*
(.242)
(.319)
(.746)
(.589)
Income
-.523*
.484*
-1.034*
.105
(.154)
(.199)
(.402)
(.422)
Previous Police Exp.
.507*
-.188
1.275*
.671*
(.087)
(.114)
(.218)
(.256)
Urban
.395*
-.175
.105
-.479
(.096)
(.119)
(.267)
(.250)
South
.109
.010
.022
.166
(.067)
(.089)
(.189)
(.199)
Born U.S.
-.026
.239
-.357
-.013
(.121)
(.162)
(.345)
(.355)
Intercept
–
-.090
-.879
-.068
(.321)
(.775)
(.654)
Cutpoint 1
-.200
–
–
–
(.248)
Cutpoint 2
1.237*
–
–
(.253)
N=
1961
1952
1961
F(df) =
8.07* (13, 1948)
3.36* (13, 1940)
5.30* (26, 1936)
Note: Entries are ordered probit (Column 1), probit (Column 2) and multinomial logit
(Columns 3 and 4) coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Sampling weights applied.
Reference category in Columns 3 and 4 is “about the right amount.” * two-tailed p < .05.
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Police Are Very
Successful At
Reducing Crime

Misconduct Rarely
or Never Leads to
False Confessions

Force Used Is
Necessary For
Arrest

Force Used Is Not
Enough Relative to
Right Amount

8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%
-4%
-6%
-8%
-10%

Crime Dramas

Conservatism

Figure 1: The Impact of Crime Dramas is on Par with Conservatism
Note: Bars show the change in probability of holding the attitudes specified at
the top of the chart as a function of watching at least an hour of crime dramas a
week or more relative to none at all, and identifying as a conservative relative to
a liberal, respectively. All other variables are held at their means and modes.
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Appendix
Distribution of Media Consumption
LI Sample (2011)

RTI Sample (2013)

Local TV News (per day)
Doesn’t watch
17
13
Less than 15 minutes
4
9
15 to 29 minutes
9
20
30 to 59 minutes
22
4
60 minutes or more
47
36
DK/Refused
2
3
Crime Dramas (per week)
Doesn’t watch
52
42
60 minutes or less
14
27
61 to 120 minutes
9
16
121 to 180 minutes
6
6
181 to 240 minutes
5
1
241 minutes or more
15
4
DK/Refused
1
4
N=
422
2119
Notes: Entries are percentages, with sampling weights applied. Columns
may not add to 100% due to rounding error.
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